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FROM BOARD OF REGENTS TO O’BANNON:
HOW ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RIGHTS
HAVE INFLUENCED COLLEGE FOOTBALL
THOMAS A. BAKER III* & NATASHA T. BRISON**

I. INTRODUCTION
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.1
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s comment concerning use of the doctrine
of stare decisis has echoed since its first utterance in countless expressions of
legal scholarship ranging from law reviews to case books. Recently, this quote
was reverberated in a speech given by former Justice John Paul Stevens at the
Sports Lawyers Association’s annual meeting on May 15, 2015. Justice Stevens
applied the quote in criticism of the use of stare decisis by the Court in Flood v.
Kuhn2 to preserve baseball’s antitrust exemption. Yet, on that same day, the
Ninth Circuit considered O’Bannon v. NCAA,3 a case that called into question
the way Justice Stevens applied antitrust law to National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) regulations in NCAA v. Board of Regents.4 Justice
Stevens wrote for the majority in Board of Regents and his holding and dicta in
* Associate Professor of sport law in the Sport Management and Policy Program at the University
of Georgia. He earned his law degree of from Loyola University of New Orleans and his Ph.D. from
the University of Florida.
** Assistant Professor in the Sport Management Division of the College of Education and Human
Development at Texas A&M University. Ms. Brison earned two undergraduate degrees from Florida
State University and a M.S. in Sports Administration from Georgia State University. She also holds
a J.D. and a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia.
1. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the Boston
University School of Law Dedication: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897).
2. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
3. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
4. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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that case provided a progeny of circuit and district courts with the fodder needed
to develop a dichotomous application of antitrust to NCAA regulations. The
dichotomy involved antitrust scrutiny of NCAA regulations that involved
commercial activities, but insulated regulations deemed necessary to preserve
the “revered tradition of amateur[]” athletics.5 The Court’s antitrust analysis
concerned the NCAA’s television broadcast plan and the limits it imposed on
college football broadcasts. Included in the protected regulations were those
that limited athlete compensation and prohibited athletes from profiting from
the use of their publicity rights, both of which were at controversy before the
Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon.
While the former Justice did not directly address his opinion in Board of
Regents or the issues in O’Bannon in his speech, his use of Justice Holmes’s
quote provided the room of lawyers and scholars with fuel for debating the
fidelity of Justice Stevens’s adherence to his application of antitrust in Board of
Regents. Reason for doubt could be found in the way in which he expanded on
the quote by saying, “I think Justice Holmes would agree that his
observation is equally applicable to a statement of law - even in one of his own
opinions - ‘if the grounds upon it was laid down have vanished and the rule
simply exists from blind imitation of the past.’”6 The statement was based
upon Justice Holmes’s drafting of the majority opinion in Federal Baseball
Club v. National League,7 the case that crafted the judicial exemption from
antitrust law that baseball enjoyed for fifty years prior to Flood. To Justice
Stevens, the fact that the exemption had survived for five decades did not
provide a justification for its continuation, insulating from antitrust law an
industry that had changed significantly since the ink dried on Holmes’s
holding.
Similarly, the commercial industry of college football has transformed
dramatically since 1984, the year Justice Stevens delivered Board of Regents.
Most of college football’s economic growth can be attributed to the influx of
monies flowing from media rights deals made possible by Board of Regents.
However, none of these new monies have been passed directly into the hands of
college football players. The actual athletes for whom the fans flip the dial to
watch have seen only modest increases in compensation and remain unable to
profit off of whatever fame the glutton of media attention brings to them. The
plaintiffs in O’Bannon tried to change all of that with their antitrust action
5. Id. at 120.
6. Justice John Paul Stevens, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Keynote Address at the Sports
Lawyers Association 41st Annual Conference Luncheon 15 (May 15, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_SportsLawyersAssociation_05-15-15.pdf (quoting Holmes,
supra note 1).
7. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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against the NCAA’s restrictions limiting athlete pay and publicity. In their
response, the NCAA in O’Bannon relied on Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of
Regents by maintaining that the prohibitions were insulated under antitrust law
as necessary to preserve the product of college football.
This begs the question: If he had to decide O’Bannon, would Justice Stevens
side with the NCAA’s reliance on his dicta? Based on his use of Holmes’s quote,
we are not so sure. It is our suspicion that Justice Stevens inferred through his
use of that quote that the grounds upon which Board of Regents were laid have
long since vanished. Granted, our reading of subtext into Justice Stevens’s
speech that day is purely speculative and it would be unfair to both the reader
and to his honor to assert our speculation as fact. Still, our suspicion is not
without basis as it is based in how Federal Baseball Club and Board of Regents
both concerned sports that underwent dramatic industrialization prior to their
respective reconsiderations in Flood and O’Bannon. In the case of Board of
Regents, added suspicion on our part as to Justice Stevens’s fidelity stems from
the manner in which the majority opinion and dicta changed college football in
ways that prompted the plaintiffs to initiate O’Bannon.
The purpose of this Article is to address the influence of antitrust on the
current state and future of college football. To accomplish this purpose, the
contents of this article include examinations on (1) the influence of the
dichotomous application of antitrust in Board of Regents on college football and
(2) the application of antitrust to student-athlete regulation based on O’Bannon.
The article begins with a reflective analysis of some of the more prominent
changes caused by the Court’s decision in Board of Regents to strip the NCAA
of what little control it had over the management of media rights for college
football television broadcasts. Following the analysis is a description of the
manipulations to the market for student-athlete services caused by Justice
Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents. Next, an examination is provided of the
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in O’Bannon that refused to recognize a
quasi-exemption from antitrust law for NCAA regulation of student-athletes.
The article concludes with a discussion of what may ensue in O’Bannon, if
anything, and in both Jenkins v. NCAA8 and Alston v. NCAA,9 two antitrust
actions demanding unlimited compensation for certain classes of
student-athletes.
II. BOARD OF REGENTS: HOW THE COURT CHANGED COLLEGE FOOTBALL
It is both convenient and economical for legal scholars to criticize a

8. 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
9. No. 3:14CV01011 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 5, 2014).
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thirty-year-old court decision from the vantage afforded to armchair justices.
Yet, the past can provide perspective on how matters should be handled going
forward. Such is the case with Board of Regents and the challenges to it posed
by O’Bannon, Jenkins, and Alston. Much has been written on the application of
law in Board of Regents, but a reexamination of both the decision and the
dramatic changes to college football that followed is needed. After all, the
influence of Board of Regents on the state of college football is still being felt
in so many different ways. To understand these changes, let us begin with the
controversy in the case and the Court’s determinations and proceed from there.
The Plaintiffs in Board of Regents were a collection of universities with
big-time football programs who challenged the NCAA’s television plan that
limited the number of games on national television and the number of times
each school could be featured on national television.10 The majority held that
the NCAA’s television plan constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade in
violation of antitrust law.11 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, identified
the NCAA’s plan as a horizontal restraint on trade that prevented individual
competitors from competing in the market for college football broadcasts.12
Justice Stevens found that the limits imposed an anticompetitive effect by
inflating the price paid for broadcasts at the expense of consumer preference for
more broadcasts.13 Furthermore, Justice Stevens viewed the NCAA’s
exercise of “complete control” over televised games as more problematic than
the limits the plan imposed.14 Instead, Justice Stevens aimed to open the market
for televised college football in a way that the individual member institutions
that make up the NCAA would each be able to manage their own rights and
compete for broadcasts in ways that benefited consumers.15
The NCAA attempted to justify its control in managing media rights for its
members with the position that the plan was the product of a “joint venture” that
“assist[ed] in the marketing of broadcast rights. . . .”16 To this end, the Court
could have aligned the NCAA’s plan with the policy behind Congress’s
expressed exemption from antitrust law for any joint marketing of rights for
televising professional sports.17 The Court recognized the professional
exemption, but in a footnote in Board of Regents, Justice Stevens called

10. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 89, 94.
11. Id. at 120.
12. Id. at 98–99.
13. Id. at 106–07.
14. Id. at 112.
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 113.
17. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2016).
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attention to a district court decision in United States v. NFL18 to support his
position that an agreement among league members concerning media rights
could still offend the Sherman Act’s aims.19 Perhaps NFL was not the best fit
for what would eventually occur in Board of Regents as the court in NFL did
not strip the league of control over media rights for its members. Rather, the
court in NFL limited its intervention to analyzing the reasonableness of the
specific commercial restraints at controversy.20
So why did the Court not limit its intervention in Board of Regents to lifting
the restriction on the number of broadcasts for NCAA members? Theoretically,
the Court could have recognized the NCAA’s joint venture justification as
procompetitive while requiring an increase of output as a less-restrictive
alternative to the limits under the NCAA’s plan. For Justice Stevens, however,
the NCAA’s joint venture justification did not fit because the NCAA was not
actually a selling agent for its member institutions.21 While the NCAA negotiated with the broadcasters in regards to the collective terms and price for the
broadcast rights, the NCAA left to the broadcasters and the schools the task of
selecting games for telecasts.22 The Court found that the NCAA’s role in managing media rights under the plan was that of a limiter, rather than a facilitator,
of televised broadcasts.23 Thus, the majority viewed the limits on output as the
sine qua non of the NCAA’s television plan and the extent of the association’s
cartel control over broadcasting rights for college football.
In addition to the joint venture position, the NCAA had two other
procompetitive justifications for preserving the plan that the Court also found
factually flawed.24 The NCAA’s second justification concerned a purported
economical threat that increased television broadcasts presented to live
attendance.25 The flaw the Court found with this position was the fact that the
NCAA had failed to produce any actual evidence that increasing the number of
broadcasts and the number of times schools could appear on television would
dramatically decrease live attendance.26
18. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). In NFL, the district court held that antitrust law did not allow
the NFL to limit stations from broadcasting games within seventy-five miles of a team not in the match
while that team was not playing at home and had its game televised by a station within that same
seventy-five-mile range. Id. at 326–27.
19. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 n.28.
20. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 328–30.
21. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 113–14.
24. See id. at 115–20.
25. Id. at 115.
26. Id. at 115–16.
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For its third and final justification, the NCAA argued that the limits on
broadcasts and appearances in its plan were necessary to maintain competitive
balance among its football programs.27 In dealing with this justification, the
Court first recognized the necessity for “a certain degree of cooperation” for
sport that distinguishes it from other types of industries.28 This makes sense in
that the market for soft drinks is not dependent on the establishment of controls
as to how Coca-Cola and Pepsi compete; and Coca-Cola does not need Pepsi in
order to make its beverage. Conversely, the University of Georgia needs the
University of Florida in order to hold its annual rivalry game in Jacksonville,
Florida. The University of Oklahoma needs the University of Texas to have the
“Red River Showdown” game every year at the Cotton Bowl in Dallas, Texas.
For those games, and all of college football to function, the Court found that
some horizontal restraints are necessary through the formation of regulatory
controls governing competition.29 The Court also recognized that controls of
this nature are “procompetitive because they enhance [the] public[’s] interest in
intercollegiate athletics.”30 The problem for the NCAA was that restraints on
telecasts did not “fit into the same mold [of] rules defining the conditions of the
contest.”31
Possibly the bigger issue with the NCAA’s competitive balance justification
was that the restraints did not actually result in competitive balance. In fact,
“The NCAA [did] not claim that its television plan ha[d] equalized [(or even
attempted to equalize)] competition” among its members.32 The Court noted
that while the NCAA’s plan was nationwide, there was “no single league or
tournament” for Division I college football.33 The television plan was not even
tailored to result in competitive balance as there was no regulation on the
amount of money that schools could spend on their football programs or the
ways in which schools could use revenues generated from television broadcasts,
ticket sales, concessions, or sponsorships.34 Furthermore, the Court found that
there was “no evidence that [the restraints imposed by the NCAA’s television
plan] produce[d] any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than
would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-producing activity.”35
27. Id. at 117.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 117–18.
33. Id. at 118.
34. Id. at 119.
35. Id.

BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RI GHTS

6/14/2016 5:29 PM

337

While all of that was true, Justice Stevens and the majority missed the mark
on one key component, perhaps the most important component and one that
framed an underlying battle taking place in Board of Regents. The mistake
made by the Court was in its position that the plan was not aimed at protecting
the competitive power of “any readily identifiable group of competitors.”36
While it is possible the NCAA did not properly present a class of competitors
that needed protecting via the plan, a vulnerable population of member schools
most certainly existed. To locate that class of competitors, the Court needed
only to look to all Division I football programs that were not part of the class of
plaintiffs. After all, those were the football programs that stood to lose from the
Court lifting the limits on college football television broadcasts. Supporting this
position is the fact that the class of complainants was not the programs that were
never featured in broadcasts via the NCAA’s television plan; the class consisted
of the programs that were featured the most.37
Joining the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia as plaintiffs were a
collection of sixty-four college football programs known as the College Football
Association (CFA). These schools represented the “haves” of college football,
those with lucrative programs that were members of the major athletic
conferences and/or enjoyed automatic access to the postseason bowls with the
largest payouts. These were the programs that wanted more broadcasts and
revenues for their rank. On the other side of the aisle was the NCAA, which
represented the interests for all of its members in Division I, not just those with
the most successful football programs. Thus, another way of viewing Board of
Regents was as a battle between the “haves” and “have-nots” of college football,
with the Plaintiffs playing the role of the haves and the NCAA serving as the
representative for and defender of the have-nots.
Unfortunately, the actual battle between the proverbial haves and have-nots
of college football was probably well on its way to being lost prior to the first
filing in Board of Regents because the television plan at controversy did not
provide for equitable revenue sharing across the Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS).38 Had that been the case, then perhaps the Court’s perception of the facts
would have supported the provision of an exemption from antitrust law for the
NCAA’s television plan based on the reasons Congress relied on in exempting
from antitrust law media-rights management for professional sports.39 Instead,
36. Id. at 118.
37. John J. Siegfried & Molly Gardner Burba, The College Football Association Television
Broadcast Cartel, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 799, 802 (2004).
38. See infra note 71.
39. Justice Stevens noted that the NCAA failed to provide evidence that its plan “produce[d] any
greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition
rates, or any other revenue-producing activity.” Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119.
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the television restraints at issue in Board of Regents merely prevented the
exacerbation of an already existing disparity in big-time college football. After
all, college football’s have-nots were already disadvantaged by their lack of
access to the payouts provided by the premier bowl games and in the disparity
existing in the profits pulled from attendance, sponsorship, and alumni
donations.
Justice Stevens and the majority should have better appreciated their
position in relation to this tug-of-war between the haves and have-nots of
college football. By stripping the NCAA of regulatory control over
media-rights management, the Court injected itself into the fray and drastically
disturbed the balance of power in favor of the haves. The in-fighting at issue in
Board of Regents was a type of organizational instability that, in the authors’
view, is best left for internal resolution rather than judicial intervention. Not
only that, but the majority was mistaken as to the NCAA’s role in managing
college football media rights for its members—a mistake that was caught in the
dissent written by Justice White, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined.
III. THE COURT’S MISTAKE AND HOW BOARD OF REGENTS SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RESOLVED
The dissent recognized that the NCAA’s role via the plan extended beyond
limiting broadcasts. Specifically, the dissent took a practical and realistic view
of how broadcast rights for football games were (and still are) actually
negotiated and sold within the “competitive market[place].”40 And under the
plan at controversy, the NCAA packaged the broadcast rights for its footballplaying members and negotiated the “real . . . price and terms” of the television
deals with broadcasters.41 “The selection[s] of games to . . . broadcast w[ere]
left to the networks” to negotiate with the individual schools “to maximize the
value of [broadcasts].”42 While the NCAA did not take a hands-on role in
working with member schools and broadcasters in selecting and managing
individual game telecasts, that fact did not trivialize the NCAA’s function in
creating the plan. Hence, the Court used a heavy-handed application of antitrust
in meeting consumer interest in more broadcasts. The Court could have, and
arguably should have, preserved the NCAA’s cartel control over media rights
as a joint venture similar to the NFL’s management of rights for its franchises.
The justifications for exempting the NFL’s cartel control over broadcast rights
provided a basis for finding a procompetitive purpose for the NCAA’s cartel
control. In NFL, the court recognized:
40. Id. at 127–28 (White, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Siegfried & Burba, supra note 37, at 801.

BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/14/2016 5:29 PM

ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RI GHTS

339

the teams should not compete too strongly with each other in a
business way. The evidence shows that in the National
Football League less than half the clubs over a period of years
are likely to be financially successful. . . . Under these
circumstances it is both wise and essential that rules be passed
to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger
ones and to keep the League in fairly even balance.43
The court in NFL went on to find that one way that professional sport
leagues could protect competitive balance on the field is to limit competition off
the field through restrictions imposed on television broadcasts.44 The
procompetitive justifications for joint venture management of media rights in
NFL can be easily applied to the facts at issue in Board of Regents. And while
it is true that the court in NFL still found that the specific limitations imposed
by the NFL’s plan were illegal under the Sherman Act,45 the court did not go as
far as to strip the league completely of its cartel control over broadcasts.46
Furthermore, the controversial decision in NFL was the primary catalyst for
Congress’s exempting league control over broadcasts with the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961.47 The Act expressly exempts from antitrust law the
sale of a television package consisting of broadcast rights by professional sports
leagues.48 With the need to protect the NCAA’s weaker programs in mind, the
Court, in Board of Regents, also could have left unchecked the NCAA’s
authority over the plan while also advancing consumer welfare by holding that
the specific restrictions on broadcast output in the plan violated antitrust law.
By limiting its reach to the broadcast output, the Court would have narrowly
tailored its application of antitrust law and drastically reduced the case’s impact
on the battle between the haves and have-nots for control over college football—
allowing the bigger conflict to play out within the organization rather than
within the halls of the Supreme Court building. This approach would have been
more deferential to the NCAA. Also, the limited approach would have allowed
the NCAA to still look out for the have-nots by negotiating terms that included
mandatory broadcasts for less-prominent schools, thereby maintaining some
degree of revenue sharing through the plan. Additionally, preservation of the
43. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
44. Id. at 324.
45. Id. at 330.
46. Id. at 326.
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2016).
48. Id. § 1291.
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plan would have left intact a foundation that possibly (even if unlikely) could
have led to increased management by the NCAA, and this could have resulted
in more meaningful sharing of media revenue among the member institutions.
As previously stated, the battle may have already been lost for the have-nots,
and it is possible that the CFA schools would have eventually wrangled away
more control from the NCAA internally, or left the NCAA and formed a new
association. Yet, whatever would have happened following a narrowly tailored
Board of Regents would have happened organically.
Justice Stevens’s heavy-handed approach in Board of Regents did more than
just end the NCAA’s control over media management for its members; the
decision set in motion a series of acts that eventually shifted the control over
media-rights management of football from the NCAA to the conferences.49
Justice Stevens and the majority may have used Board of Regents to open up a
market in which individual institutions would compete for the benefit of
consumers,50 but that is not exactly what happened. While a few individual
schools manage all three tiers of their media rights,51 most have deferred
media-rights management to their respective conferences.52 By ending the
NCAA’s cartel control over managing broadcast rights for all of its institutions,
Board of Regents effectively replaced the NCAA with the CFA, which
controlled broadcasting rights for only its members and excluded all non-CFA
programs from sharing in the pot.53 The CFA’s cartel control, however, was
subsequently limited by another antitrust action in Regents of the University of
California v. American Broadcasting Cos. (ABC Sports).54 In ABC Sports, the
Ninth Circuit tracked the Court’s reasoning in Board of Regents and found that
antitrust law would not allow the CFA’s exclusive deal with ABC to block
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) from broadcasting University of Notre Dame and Pacific-10 Conference
(Pac-10) games.55 Following ABC Sports, the CFA managed media rights for
its original members sans Notre Dame and the Pac-10. But in 1995, the CFA
lost cartel control and ceased to exist when the SEC and Big East decided to

49. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, The Bowl Championship Series, Conference Realignment and
the Major College Football Oligopoly: Revolution Not Reform, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 321, 334
(2012).
50. Justice Stevens criticized the NCAA’s plan in Board of Regents because “[n]o individual school
[was] free to televise its own games without restraint.” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115
(1984).
51. Such as Notre Dame, Brigham Young, Army, and Texas.
52. See Mathewson, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. See id. at 521.
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manage their respective media rights.56
Accordingly, Board of Regents did not accomplish Justice Stevens’s
vision of media-rights management at the institution/program level. In fact,
very few FBS programs manage all three tiers of their media rights.57 The
dissent was correct: the competitive marketplace for college football broadcasts
necessitates the collective packaging of rights.58 Looking at what is happening
today, instead of league-wide cartel control at the NCAA level, college football
broadcast rights are controlled by a small number of mini-cartels at the
conference level. The shift from NCAA management of media rights to
conference management that resulted from Board of Regents set in motion a
tectonic shift in power that would reshape college athletics, not just football.
IV. THE FALLOUT RESULTING FROM BOARD OF REGENTS
Today, college football consists of mid-major programs (less prestigious
programs that form the “Group of 5”)59 and a group of conferences that are
collectively called the Power 5 (P5).60 The P5 includes the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference (Big Ten), Big 12 Conference (Big 12),
Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern Conference (SEC), and
represents the most powerful football programs in the FBS.61 The P5
conferences are also those with the most lucrative television contracts—some
even have their own networks.62 However, it is important to note that not all
members of the P5 are power programs in terms of their competitive
contributions to the actual sport of college football. The schools within the P5
are fortunate enough to have historical ties to conferences that include
prominent and very successful programs. The arbitrariness of conference
affiliation in P5 conferences has proved harmful to many successful football
programs that found themselves on the outside looking in, while less successful
football programs within the P5 have reaped financial benefits from shared
56. See Mathewson, supra note 49, at 334–35.
57. Our research found that only Notre Dame and Brigham Young control their media rights and
both are not full participating members of any athletic conference (for all sports).
58. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 128 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
59. The Group of Five consists of the American Athletic Conference, Conference USA, the
Mid-American Conference, the Mountain West Conference, and the Sun Belt Conference. Bill Bender,
Power 5 vs. Group of 5: College Football’s Split Decision, SPORTING NEWS (June 9, 2014),
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football-news/4589827-power-5-conferences-autonomy-ncaagroup-of-5-nick-saban-mike-slive-division-iv-split.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Some conferences with their own networks are the SEC Network, the Pac-12 Network, and the
Big Ten Network.
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media-rights revenues derived from conference affiliations.
The P5 conferences were reshaped based on conference realignment from
their original formations (mostly based on historical alliances) in the 1990s and
throughout the 2000s. Board of Regents was a catalyst for conference
realignment because the process was fueled by conferences desiring the
acquisition of new, large media markets in order to secure bigger and better
media deals.63 Conferences cannibalized each other through realignment with
major conferences raiding other major, and even mid-major, conferences for
new members for new media markets. The transition was not orderly, and the
mass movement of programs from one league to another caused one league to
close shop (Southwest Conference) and several others to drop football (Big East
Conference, Big West Conference, and Western Athletic Conference). In vain
efforts to remain relevant in football, two conferences and two members from
realignment-affected leagues actually sued departing members.64 When the
dust had settled, for the time being, realignment had transformed the most
prominent football conferences from eight ten-member regional leagues with
schools in relative proximity to each other to twelve fourteen-member goliaths
with geographic reaches that stretched across the country.
In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens recognized that antitrust is a
mechanism for “consumer welfare prescription,”65 but that conference
realignment harmed college football consumers because it (1) made travel for
road games difficult by increasing the distance between schools and (2)
eradicated many longstanding annual rivalry series by separating rival programs
into different leagues.66 Furthermore, Board of Regents did not protect
consumers of mid-major football programs as their favorite schools found
themselves unable to financially compete with P5 schools for top talent.
Compounding that problem is the fact that mid-majors make up almost half of
the FBS.

63. Ronald A. Smith, Intercollegiate Athletic Associations and Conferences, in SPORTS IN AMERICA
(Steven A. Riess ed., 2015).
64. Christian Dennie, Conference Realignment: From Backyard Brawls to Cash Cows, 1 MISS.
SPORTS L. REV. 249, 257–64 (2012).
65. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 343 (1979)).
66. Dennie, supra note 64, at 278; see also Conference Realignment Poll, BAYLOR U.,
http://www.baylor.edu/survey/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (showing the results of a survey revealing that
76% of alumni polled preferred traditional rivalries between schools in close proximity to each other
over those resulting from conference realignment that creates super conferences); Cody T. Havard &
Terry Eddy, Qualitative Assessment of Rivalry and Conference Realignment in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 6 J. ISSUES INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 216, 222–27 (2013) (noting a study that
empirically examined the harm caused to consumers of college football by studying fan reaction to loss
of traditional rivalry games based on conference realignment).
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
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Unfortunately for the mid-majors, the management of media rights for
college football’s postseason also produced substantial inequity. Almost since
its inception, college football’s postseason has been managed by the bowls,
games produced by bowl committees that pit teams from different leagues
against each other in a number of mini-championships.67 The national
champion of college football, however, was decided by various polls that often
produced conflicting results by crowning different champions.68 In the early
1990s, the most prominent conferences pulled together with the most powerful
bowl committees and interested television networks to coordinate college
football’s postseason in a way that would result in the crowning of a
champion.69 With no control over regular season broadcast rights or postseason
bowl games and their broadcast rights, the NCAA had no place at the table in
these discussions. Emerging from this unholy alliance of commercially-driven
partners was an entity that would grow into the nefarious Bowl Championship
Series (BCS).70 The NCAA manages the playoffs for its football-playing
members in divisions below what was once called Division I-A71 but does not
manage the playoff for its premier college football division.
Before the advent of the playoff for the FBS division, the BCS decided who
would play in the national title game for sixteen years72 and the damage it did
to college football is lasting, and likely permanent. The BCS effectively divided
programs in the premier subdivision of college football into BCS
programs and non-BCS programs; the non-BCS programs were the mid-major
programs.73 The BCS schools were those in the premier athletic conferences
(composed mostly of former CFA programs) that enjoyed automatic access for
league champions into BCS Bowls (i.e., the premier bowls represented in the
BCS format).74 But more importantly, the BCS schools were also those that
67. Jodi M. Warmbrod, Comment, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long: Why Non-BCS
Universities Should Punt Rather than Go for an Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Championship Series,
57 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 336–39 (2004).
68. Id. at 338–39.
69. C. Paul Rogers III, The Quest for Number One in College Football: The Revised Bowl
Championship Series, Antitrust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 285,
286–87 (2008).
70. Id. (noting that what would become the BCS was first called the Bowl Coalition and then called
the Bowl Alliance before changing to the BCS).
71. Division I-A is now called the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). Divisional Differences and
the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited June 9, 2016).
72. See Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl
Championship Series Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 219, 229–30
(2007).
73. Rogers, supra note 69, at 287–88.
74. Id. at 288–89.
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automatically shared in the television revenues generated by the package and
sale of the rights to televise the BCS bowl games.75 It took the threat of antitrust
litigation for mid-major programs to gain limited access to the BCS, which
allowed the few accessing programs to financially benefit.76 Yet, from its
inception to its folding, no mid-major program was ever selected to play in the
BCS Championship program. The lack of financial benefits associated with the
BCS and the distinction as mid-major were two key variables that made it
virtually impossible for mid-major programs to compete with BCS schools for
college football recruits.77
The truth is that competitive equity never existed in college football, and it
is highly possible that the landscape of college football would have eventually
been reshaped no matter the result in Board of Regents. It is also true that Board
of Regents set into motion the events that changed college football in ways that
harmed consumers, particularly the fans of mid-major programs.78 In fact, the
term “mid-major” did not exist prior to the infusion of commercialization
through increased media exposure and media-generated revenues made possible
by Board of Regents. Thus, no matter what happens in O’Bannon, a lasting
legacy will remain from Board of Regents in the great disparity in power and
financial resources that now exist between the haves and have-nots of college
football.79 These disparities were caused because the Court took a side in the
battle for control over college football media-rights management, and a strong
case could be made that the Court chose the wrong side.
V. JUSTICE STEVENS’S DICTA AND THE MANIPULATED MARKET FOR
COLLEGE ATHLETES
Justice Stevens was right about one key fact in his decision in Board of
Regents: consumers wanted substantially more televised college football than
the NCAA’s plan provided. It took a bit of time, but in the wake of Board of
75. Id. (noting that the BCS “guaranteed almost $1 million” to each BCS school while all others
were
“receiv[ing] as little as $180,000 before expenses”).
76. Schmit, supra note 72, at 234.
77. See Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, Institutional Change in the NCAA and Competitive
Balance in Intercollegiate Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 197, 197–209 (John Fizel &
Rodney Fort eds., 2004) (highlighting a study using both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) measures to examine the influence of regulatory changes on
competitive balance in college football between 1888-2001 found that the BCS, in just four seasons,
had a negative effect on competitive balance using the SCP measure).
78. See generally Brian Goff, College Football ‘Mid Majors’ Face Uncertain Future, FORBES (Sept.
1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briangoff/2014/09/01/college-football-mid-majors-face-uncertain-future/.
79. See Depken & Wilson, supra note 77.
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Regents, college football has ballooned into an industry worth billions of
dollars, in large part due to the monies mined from the leverage of media
rights.80 The gross commercialization resulting from the influx of media
money has led former University of Texas football coach Mack Brown to
believe, “College football is growing closer and closer to being like the
N.F.L.”81 The industrial growth of NCAA football has also increased the
competition for college-athlete services and the spending needed to attract them
to campus. Yet, the athletes, the most necessary of inputs for the product of
college football,82 have not financially benefited from the gross increases in
spending on their sports. Since 1973, NCAA “amateurism” regulations have
capped athlete compensation at roughly the same rate, covering only tuition,
books, and room and board.83 Only recently, starting August 1, 2015, has
grant-in-aid seen an increase by way of an option for programs to extend athlete
compensation to include costs of attendance for each school.84 The push for
this extension was in response to O’Bannon and other antitrust actions lodged
against the NCAA.85 While a step in the right direction, a cost of attendance
allowance is just a mere extension of the existing cap on student-athlete
compensation—one that is not calculated based on revenue.86
Still, the cap on student-athlete compensation has not slowed competition
for athlete services. Instead, the cap has allowed for the inflation of an “arm’s
race” in which NCAA member institutions compete for college athletes by
spending on the best coaches and building preposterously lavish facilities.87
The distorted marketplace for college-athlete services resulting from Board of
80. ESPN has agreed to pay $7.3 billion over twelve years for the rights to televise seven playoff
games per year. Based on revenues from this new playoff system, the P5 conferences saw increases in
base revenues from $28 million in 2013–2014 to about $50 million in 2014–2015, further adding to the
income disparity between the P5 and the Group of 5. Marc Tracy & Tim Rohan, What Made College
Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 Billion, for a Start, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/sports/ncaafootball/what-made-college-ball-more-like-the-pros-73-billion-fora-start.html?_r=0.
81. Id.
82. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
83. Mark Snyder, The NCAA’s Grant in Aid Cap: Injustice Forced on Student-Athletes 5 (2015)
(unpublished comment, Seton Hall University Law School Student Scholarship), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1695&context=student_scholarship.
84. Steve Berkowitz & Andrew Kreighbaum, College Athletes Cashing in with Millions in New
Benefits, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/
08/18/ncaa-cost-attendance-meals-2015/31904839/.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Brian Bennett, Arms Race Proves Recession-Proof, ESPN (June 14, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8047787/college-football-facilities-arms-race-provesrecession-proof.
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Regents matches predictions made for the market for assistant coaches in Law
v. NCAA.88 In Law, the Tenth Circuit anticipated that a cap on coach pay would
not control the constantly spiraling costs for college athletics, as schools would
merely find other things on which to spend in competition against each other.89
The Tenth Circuit’s predictions of how a cap on compensation imposed by
NCAA regulations would result in schools redirecting rather than limiting
spending proved true, but to the detriment of student-athletes rather than
coaches. The redirection of monies at the expense of athletes can be blamed, in
part at least, on the influence of dicta in Board of Regents, which provided
federal district and circuit courts with the cover needed to insulate from antitrust
law the NCAA’s regulation of athlete compensation.
Student-athlete regulation was not even before the Court, yet Justice
Stevens addressed the subject with several statements in dicta, including one
providing that the NCAA “need[ed] ample latitude” in preserving the “revered
tradition of amateurism.”90 Included in Justice Stevens’s latitude were athlete
regulations that prevent athletes from being paid because he deemed them
necessary for protecting consumer interest in safeguarding college football as a
product distinct from professional football.91 Following Board of Regents, a
number of district courts and appellate circuits relied on Justice Stevens’s dicta
in fashioning an application of antitrust law that shielded from review all
regulation of college athletes. Most did so by refusing to recognize a relevant
market for athlete services based on the distinction Justice Stevens drew
between amateur and professional football.92
In spite of this, there has been a shift in the conceptual framework as to how
antitrust applies (or does not) to NCAA student-athlete regulations, and this
shift emerged from the Ninth Circuit in Tanaka v. University of Southern
California.93 In Tanaka, a soccer player at the University of Southern
California challenged a Pac-10 transfer rule that required her to sit out one full
year prior to her playing for the University of California, Los Angeles on the
grounds that the rule violated antitrust laws.94 At first blush, the fact that the
88. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
89. Id. at 1023.
90. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
91. Id. at 101–02.
92. Thomas A. Baker III, Joel G. Maxcy & Cyntrice Thomas, White v. NCAA: A Chink in the
Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 91 (2011); see also Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180,
185–86 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA,
845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d
569, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
93. 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 1061–62.
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Ninth Circuit in Tanaka held that the Plaintiff failed to establish a relevant
market for her services95 seems to match the trend of courts refusing to
recognize relevant markets for student-athletes following Board of Regents. A
closer look, however, reveals that the Ninth Circuit in Tanaka actually
recognized that relevant product and geographic markets might exist for
student-athlete services, but the Plaintiff erred in establishing a relevant
market by restricting the reach of her product and geographic markets to a
single program and the reach of her anticompetitive effect to herself.96 The
Ninth Circuit, in Tanaka, left open the possibility that a larger relevant market
exists in the competition for student-athlete services on a regional or national
level. In fact, the court actually found that the Pac-10 provided the Plaintiff in
Tanaka with a definable relevant product market based on the fact that she was
actively recruited by a number of schools within the league.97
The shift in approach continued just four years later with a district court
decision, also out of the Ninth Circuit. In re NCAA 1-A Walk-On Football
Players Litigation (Walk-On Football Players) concerned an antitrust challenge
to NCAA scholarship restrictions that prevented walk-on players from receiving
athletics-based financial aid.98 The court in Walk-On Football Players looked
to the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Law to find that the market for
student-athletes was not unlike the market the Tenth Circuit recognized for
assistant coaches.99 To show a relevant market, plaintiffs must be able to
establish reasonable product interchangeability and cross-price elasticity.100
The court in Walk-On Football Players found that those two requirements were
met by the Plaintiffs’ proof that a dearth of viable substitutes existed for
student-athletes who desired to compete at the highest level of competition in
amateur football.101
Following Walk-On Football Players was White v. NCAA,102 which was the
first plausible and well-crafted antitrust attack on the NCAA regulations that
limit student-athlete compensation. The plausibility in White was found in how
the Plaintiffs did not attempt to defeat or dismiss the “preservation of
amateurism” justification, and the smart crafting was found in how the
Plaintiffs proffered their relevant market. The Plaintiffs in White understood
95. Id. at 1063–64.
96. Id. at 1065.
97. Id. at 1063–64.
98. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig.,398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1146–47 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
99. Id. at 1150.
100. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–95 (1956).
101. Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
102. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-999-RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066802 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006).
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the uphill battle they would face if they were to wage an attempt at reversing
decades of decisions that relied on Justice Stevens’s call for ample latitude in
preserving amateurism at their expense.103 The Plaintiffs were modest in their
demand and sought incremental gains rather than full-scale assault on the ample
latitude that Justice Stevens believed the NCAA needed in preserving
amateurism.104 Specifically, the plaintiffs in White did not challenge the
NCAA’s authority in enforcing a cap on athlete compensation under the
antitrust laws. Instead, the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims challenged the artificiality
of the grant-in-aid calculation because it did not cover the full cost of
attendance.105
Turning next to their relevant market, the plaintiffs in White carefully
proffered markets, both in the NCAA’s Division I, consisting of (1) major
college football programs and (2) major college basketball programs.106 In
support of these two markets, the plaintiffs asserted that no reasonably
interchangeable substitutes existed for the would-be student-athletes who
desired the unique mix of academics and athletics offered at Division I’s highest
levels for each sport.107 Note that the markets identified in their complaint
placed the plaintiffs in the position of buyers rather than sellers—the necessary
“inputs” for making the product as acknowledged in Walk-On Football
Players.108 By framing the markets in this manner, the Plaintiffs allowed the
court in White to recognize relevant markets within these sports without having
to make determinations on the markets for college athlete services. The
thoughtful pleading paid off for the Plaintiffs because the court in White denied
the NCAA’s motion to dismiss and in doing so held that the Plaintiffs’ relevant
market was legally sufficient to survive judgment as a matter of law.109 Mere
months later, the NCAA settled the case with the Plaintiffs in White for $10
million.110 While the case did not proceed to verdict and no precedent was set,
103. See generally Second Amended Complaint for Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006),
http://www.ncaaclassaction.com/complaint.pdf.
104. Baker, Maxcy & Thomas, supra note 92, at 95.
105. Second Amended Complaint for Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
supra note 103, at 6.
106. Id. at 10–11.
107. Id. at 11–13.
108. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
109. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066802, at *2–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
21, 2006).
110. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Defendant NCAA, White v.
NCAA, No. CV06-0999 VBF (MANx), 2008 WL 890625, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008). The $10
million was for distribution on a claims-made basis, and the settlement required that students have
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the Plaintiffs in White set the stage for what would come in O’Bannon and
provided the plaintiffs in O’Bannon with an antitrust roadmap for attacking the
NCAA’s compensation cap in a way that would work around Justice Stevens’s
dicta in Board of Regents.111
VI. O’BANNON V. NCAA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT TACKLES BOARD OF REGENTS
On September 30, 2015, the Ninth Circuit addressed arguments in
O’Bannon that were very similar to those presented in White and held that the
NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from the rule of reason analysis
under antitrust law.112 The Ninth Circuit’s order affirmed, in part,113 a district
court decision that held that the NCAA’s amateurism provisions violated § 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.114 This section of the Article will summarize the
specifics of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that effectively ended, for now, the
quasi-antitrust exemption for NCAA amateurism regulations that emerged from
Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents.
A. First Down: No Quasi-Exemption Exists for Amateurism Rules
For its first order of business, the Ninth Circuit quickly put to rest the
notion that the NCAA amateurism rules were “valid as a matter of law.”115 In
its appeal, the NCAA argued Board of Regents held that rules relating to the
amateur aspects of college athletics were “presumptively valid.”116 In support
of its position of a quasi-exemption for its regulation of student-athletes, the
NCAA relied on three decisions from the Ninth Circuit’s “sister circuits” in
Smith v. NCAA, McCormack v. NCAA, and Agnew v. NCAA.117 The NCAA was
not misguided in relying on these three decisions because all three relied on
Justice Stevens’s dicta in fortifying the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions from
antitrust review. Oddly, the Ninth Circuit singled out Agnew as the only one
from the three that came “close to agreeing with the NCAA’s interpretation of
Board of Regents.”118
What is odd about that finding is that Smith clearly stands for the position
that the NCAA’s student-athlete regulations were immune to the antitrust laws.
access to another $218 million that existed within a slush fund used to fund student expenses. Id.
111. Baker, Maxcy & Thomas, supra note 92, at 94.
112. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015).
113. Id. at 1079.
114. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
115. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061–64.
116. Id. at 1063.
117. Id. at 1064.
118. Id.
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In Smith, the Third Circuit held that the NCAA’s eligibility rules were not
commercial or business activities because they did not confer to the NCAA a
commercial advantage.119 The Ninth Circuit recognized this holding in
O’Bannon.120 But what the Ninth Circuit neglected was the Third Circuit’s
finding in Smith that even if the regulation at issue was viewed by the court to
be economics-driven, the court would have still held it to be noncommercial
because it furthered the NCAA’s procompetitive goals of fair competition and
the survival of intercollegiate athletics.121 In fact, in Agnew, the Seventh
Circuit looked to Smith as providing a definitive determination that, within the
Third Circuit, the NCAA’s eligibility regulations were not commercial and,
therefore, outside of the Sherman Act’s reach.122 Further, the Seventh Circuit
in Agnew diverted from Smith’s definitive holding and instead found that the
antitrust laws apply generally to the NCAA’s Bylaws.123 For the court in
Agnew, the application of antitrust to NCAA regulations turned on the
commerciality of any specific NCAA Bylaw based on a relevant market
analysis.124 This position was in stark contrast to that taken by the same circuit
in Banks v. NCAA.125 In Banks, the Seventh Circuit held that the NCAA’s
no-draft rule was incapable of restraining trade in the marketplace for college
football players “because the NCAA does not exist as a minor league training
ground for future NFL players. . . .”126 Thus, Agnew was a small step forward
from Banks for student-athlete plaintiffs, and most definitely did not provide the
NCAA with a blanket per se presumption of validity, even though the Seventh
Circuit was not ready to recognize either a relevant education or labor market
existing within NCAA college athletics.
What the Ninth Circuit did next was also curious; it took the NCAA’s bait
by distinguishing between the per se presumption of validity position and the
NCAA’s argument that its Bylaws were not commercial. This was curious
because the Ninth Circuit had no need to distinguish between the per se validity
and the commerciality arguments. After all, the fundamental reason that
decades of decisions had exempted NCAA Bylaws from antitrust review was
due to the fact that the regulations were found to be noncommercial based on
Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents. Thus, the two positions were
connected rather than distinguishable, and the Ninth Circuit could have (and
119. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998).
120. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065.
121. Smith, 139 F.3d at 186.
122. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir. 2012).
123. Id. at 340.
124. Id.
125. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
126. Id. at 1089–90.
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arguably should have) treated them as such.
The reason why the Ninth Circuit probably should have addressed these
positions in one fell swoop, rather than independently, is found in how the court
countered the NCAA’s noncommercial position. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished the compensation rules in O’Bannon from the regulations at issue
in Smith and Bassett v. NCAA,127 respectively.128 The problem with this
approach is that it gave credence to the existence of the per se validity provided
by the dichotomous approach (which exempted NCAA Bylaws as
noncommercial) and required the court to engage in a level of analysis that is
not required under the rule of reason. Particularly, by distinguishing the
compensation requirements as commercial, in comparison to the
noncommercial regulations at issue in Smith and Bassett, the Ninth Circuit
satisfied a “commerciality” step that is not required under the rule of reason
analysis. Instead, the court in O’Bannon should have simply recognized the
applicability of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s Bylaws and then followed the
approach taken in Agnew by addressing the commercial nature of the
compensation caps through relevant market analysis.
So why did the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon go to such exhaustive lengths in
countering the NCAA’s confounding arguments on the applicability of the
antitrust laws to its amateurism regulations? It is possible that the Ninth
Circuit was just being thorough. Or perhaps the court’s complex and tedious
analysis was, in part at least, an act of deference to Justice Stevens and his
dicta in Board of Regents. Where Justice Stevens in Board of Regents was
deferential toward the NCAA with the statement that the association “needs
ample latitude” to preserve the “revered tradition of amateurism,”129 the Ninth
Circuit in O’Bannon showed deference to Justice Stevens with its finding that
nothing in Board of Regents limited the application of antitrust laws to the
NCAA’s amateurism rules.130 To this end, the Ninth Circuit even stated that it
did “not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly” and, where
applicable, would afford Justice Stevens’s dicta with “appropriate
deference.”131 But to the Ninth Circuit, that deference did not extend to it using
what was actually a procompetitive justification (preservation of amateurism)
to exempt the NCAA’s student-athlete compensation regulations from antitrust
scrutiny as “automatically lawful. . . .”132 Our review of the decision leads to
127. 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). In Bassett v. NCAA, the Sixth Circuit held that NCAA regulations
prohibiting “improper inducements” to athletic recruits were “explicitly non-commercial.” Id. at 433.
128. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
129. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
130. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013)).
132. Id. at 1063–64.
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the conclusion that the court in O’Bannon took substantial measures because it
understood the magnitude of its decision. By subjecting the NCAA’s
amateurism regulations to the rule of reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit deviated
from the line of district and circuit cases that interpreted Justice Stevens’s dicta
in ways that fortified the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions as noncommercial
and, therefore, outside of § 1 jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in
O’Bannon may have been a bit clumsy in its analysis on first down, but the court
gained positive yardage on the play and set the stage for the first step in the rule
of reason analysis, which focused on the relevant markets.
B. Second Down: The Markets
Arguably, no hurdle has been more difficult to clear for student-athlete
plaintiffs in establishing antitrust claims against the NCAA than step one of the
rule of reason analysis, which requires plaintiffs to show “significant
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.”133 In fact, until O’Bannon,
no student-driven litigation had ever progressed past this play. The courts and
circuits following Board of Regents had been steadfast in failing to find a
relevant market within NCAA athletics for student-athletes. While Tanaka,
Walk-On Football Players, and even White provided the plaintiffs in O’Bannon
with some traction for overcoming the relevant market hurdle, those cases held
no precedential value for the Ninth Circuit. Thus, the Plaintiffs in O’Bannon
had the very daunting task of convincing the Ninth Circuit to be the first of the
federal circuits to find a relevant market that would subject the NCAA’s
amateurism provisions to the second step of the rule of reason analysis.134
Initially, there were two purported markets at play in O’Bannon based on
the district court’s determinations. The first was the college education market.
This market included the “unique bundles of goods and services” that FBS
football and Division I basketball schools offer in recruiting against each other
for the best student-athletes.135 The second market was a “group licensing
market” for three submarkets in which student-athlete names, images, and
133. Id. at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
134. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). The case involved an antitrust challenge
to the cap the NCAA places on football scholarships. While the Seventh Circuit in Agnew did not find
a relevant market for student-athlete services, it disagreed with the district court’s determination that a
relevant market could not be established. In this instance, however, the court rejected the markets
proffered by the plaintiffs, which were (1) a market for educational services similar to that which was
alleged in White, and (2) a labor market for student-athlete services. Id. at 346. The primary problem
the court had with the education product market was that it would include far more than those who were
scholarship athletes; making the purported market unclear rather than cognizable. Id. The problem
with the court had with the labor market was that the plaintiffs did not provide any evidence supporting
the existence of the market. Id. at 346–47.
135. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RI GHTS

6/14/2016 5:29 PM

353

likenesses (NILs) were commercially licensed: (1) live game telecasts, (2)
sports video games, and (3) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archived materials.136
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the two markets into
one, the college education market. In doing so, the court recognized three
factual findings from the district court that were substantially supported by the
record: “(1) that a cognizable ‘college education market’ exist[ed]” in the
compensation for student-athlete recruits through the offering of scholarships
and other “amenities” (coaching and facility use); (2) the NCAA’s
compensation rules restrained the competition for student-athlete recruits so that
programs were unable to offer compensation for the use of student-athlete NILs;
and (3) the restraint imposed by the NCAA’s “compensation rules . . . ha[d] a
significant anticompetitive effect on the college education market” by fixing the
price for college attendance.137 Further, the Ninth Circuit found that the
NCAA’s appeal “[did] not challenge the district court’s findings,” conceding
the existence of a relevant college education market.138 Instead, the NCAA
centered its defense on three “modest” positions for why the Plaintiffs did not
establish a significant anticompetitive effect.139
First, the NCAA argued that the Plaintiffs’ inability to show a decrease in
output of scholarships within the college education market prevented them from
demonstrating an anticompetitive effect.140 The NCAA pointed to increases in
opportunities as proof that its regulations were not anticompetitive.141 The
problem with that position, as the Ninth Circuit so easily pointed out, is that
“output [reduction] is not the only [type] of anticompetitive effect.”142 Another
type is found in horizontal “price-fixing . . . by purchasers,” and this is true even
when the injured parties are sellers rather than consumers.143 The court looked
to the district court’s determination that the students were harmed by the
price-fixing agreement that they would only be compensated at the cost of
grant-in-aid, thus valuing their NILs at zero.144 Thus, the price cap imposed by
136. Id. at 968.
137. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948)). The court also noted that various types of anticompetitive practices like
prices raises, output reductions, and market divisions all had the same anticompetitive effects. Id. at
1071 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 777 (1999)).
144. Id. (citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 972–73 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
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the compensation regulations produced anticompetitive effects.145
Next, the court quickly dismissed the NCAA’s second argument that there
could be no anticompetitive effect because student-athlete NILs were worth
nothing.146 The problem with this position is that the NCAA set the value.147
The Ninth Circuit then rejected the NCAA’s final anticompetitive effect
position; the argument that, in the absence of a cap, student-athletes had de
minimis value in their NIL rights.148 The court found that the NCAA’s last
position was flawed because the “too small to matter” defense was inconsistent
with the Supreme Court precedent in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.149 In
Catalano, the Court stated, “It is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves
reasonable.”150 The Ninth Circuit also relied on reasoning in Board of Regents
in which the Court held that the NCAA’s television plan could have
anticompetitive effects without need for delving into the details of how much
the price was fixed.151 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon upheld the
district court’s decision “that the [NCAA’s] compensation rules ha[d] a
significant anticompetitive effect on the college education market.”152
C. Third Down: The NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications
On third and long, the NCAA found itself with the burden of proving that
the anticompetitive effects imposed by the compensation regulations were
justified by offsetting procompetitive effects. To defend its compensation rules,
the NCAA turned to the same tried, but not always true, justifications on which
the organization relied on in the few cases that courts found to be at the
commercial end of the dichotomy: (1) promotion of amateur athletics, (2)
promotion of competitive balance, (3) the integration of student-athletes within
the school community, “and (4) increasing output in the college education
market . . . .”153 At the same time, however, the NCAA focused only on the
promotion of amateurism in its arguments on appeal.154 For this reason, the
Ninth Circuit had little difficulty “accept[ing] the district court’s . . . findings
that the compensation rules [did] not promote competitive balance [or] increase
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1069.
148. Id. at 1071.
149. Id. (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam)).
150. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647.
151. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–05 (1984)).
152. Id.
153. Id.; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
154. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
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output in the college education market.”155
As for the output argument, the Ninth Circuit was left unconvinced by the
NCAA’s claim that its compensation restrictions were procompetitive on the
position that they widened student-athlete choice.156 Specifically, the court
recognized that if the NCAA’s compensation rules were abandoned, or at least
loosened, then student-athletes would actually have a wider range of choices in
terms of which schools to select because student-athletes could make
decisions based on scholarship offerings.157 Further, the Ninth Circuit found
that lifting the limits on compensation might actually provide student-athletes
with the financial means to stay in school longer based on income derived from
the use of their NILs.158 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA’s
outcome or “choices” argument.159
The Ninth Circuit, however, was convinced that NCAA compensation rules
served two purposes: “[(1)] integrating academics with athletics, and [(2)]
‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product’” through the preservation of
the “revered tradition of amateurism.”160 The court found that “the
district court[’s findings] and . . . record support[] . . . a concrete
procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism . . . .” 161 The
court recognized that the premise of this effect is consistent with Justice
Stevens’s dicta in which he assumed that consumers of college football prefer
that particular brand to professional football because of the “academic tradition”
associated with the college product.162
D. Fourth Down: Alternatives
The recognition of procompetitive justifications for an anticompetitive
restraint shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s
justifications could be met with a virtually effective and less-restrictive
alternative.163 The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon added to that burden by
recognizing Board of Regents’ deferential mandate that the NCAA be afforded
“ample latitude” as the superintendent of collegiate athletics.164 With that
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1073.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
161. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
162. Id. at 1074 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02).
163. County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120).
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burden and deference in mind, the Ninth Circuit addressed the two less
restrictive alternatives that the district court identified: (1) allowing NCAA
member institutions to extend the compensation limit to cover the full cost of
attendance; and (2) allowing schools to pay student-athletes a modest amount
(up to $5,000.00 per year) of deferred cash in exchange for the use of
student-athlete NILs.165
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s first alternative, finding
that a cost-of-attendance allowance would not tarnish the revered tradition of
amateurism because the money would be used to cover “legitimate costs” to
attend school.166 The court could find no evidence in the record “suggest[ing]
that consumers of college sports would be[] less interested . . . if
[student-]athletes” were provided the allowance.167 Similarly, the court could
not find anything in the record supporting the notion that a cost-of-attendance
allowance “would impede the integration of student-athletes into their
academic communities.”168 The Ninth Circuit accepted the cost-of-attendance
alternative over fear mongering from the NCAA and its amici, a collection of
antitrust law scholars.169 Both the NCAA and the amici cautioned that such a
finding would open the floodgates to all sorts of new litigation directed at
incremental changes in NCAA policy.170 Additionally, the NCAA and its amici
asserted that it is not the role of the courts to make marginal market adjustments
based on applications of antitrust laws.171 Instead, they believed that the cap
should have been preserved because it served a “reasonably . . . valid business
purpose . . . .”172
While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the NCAA and its amici that, as a
general rule, “[A]ntitrust law [should not be used] to make marginal
adjustments to broadly reasonable market restraints,” the court disagreed with
the argument that a reasonably valid business purpose should trump a

165. Id. at 1074–79 (referencing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1004–07 (N.D. Cal.
2014)).
166. Id. at 1074–75 (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983).
167. Id. at 1075.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellant, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068),
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/11/24/14-16601%20Amicus%20brief%20by%20Law%20&%20Econ%20Scholars.pdf.
170. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075; Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 169, at 3.
171. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075; Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 169, at 13.
172. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075.
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less-restrictive alternative in antitrust analysis.173 What the Ninth Circuit was
perhaps too polite to address in its response to the NCAA and its amici was the
audacity of the reasonably valid business purpose position. Had the court
accepted the notion that the mere existence of a reasonably valid business
purpose precludes evidence of a less-restrictive alternative, the Ninth Circuit
would have effectively altered the rule of reason so as to do away with its third
prong. After all, the third step in the rule always follows a court’s finding of
reasonably valid business purposes that have been labeled as procompetitive
justifications. Instead, the court recognized that the degree of modification to
the market is irrelevant as long as the means serves as a less-restrictive
alternative for achieving the valid business purpose.174
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the floodgates argument and did so by
restraining its holding to the specific NCAA restraints that limited
student-athlete compensation to grant-in-aid.175 The court cautioned potential
classes of future plaintiffs that its decision was not a declaration of open
season for shooting down NCAA regulations, stating that courts were not “free
to micromanage organizational rules or to strike down largely beneficial
market restraints with impunity.”176 Rather, the Ninth Circuit limited its
decision to a restraint that it found to be “patently and inexplicably stricter
than . . . necessary.”177
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding a
less-restrictive alternative that would have allowed student-athletes to profit off
of their NILs.178 The court contrasted the cost-of-attendance option with NIL
compensation and found that the two were not equally effective in meeting the
procompetitive purpose of preserving consumer interest in amateur athletics.179
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court ignored the premise behind the
preservation of amateurism justification: “that not paying student-athletes is
precisely what makes them amateurs.”180 With this finding, the court vacated
the district court’s injunction that required its members to pay student-athletes
deferred compensation of up to $5,000 per year for the use of their NILs.181

173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis omitted).
178. Id. at 1076.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis omitted).
181. Id. at 1078–79.
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E. Overtime: Did the Plaintiffs Win, Lose, or Draw in the Ninth Circuit?
Not long after the opinion went public, a plethora of pundits did the same
with their opinions on the ramifications of the most high-profile antitrust action
involving the NCAA since Board of Regents. Two trains of expert thought
emerged from the coverage of the case in both traditional and social media: (1)
the Ninth Circuit’s decision was incredibly significant because it subjected
NCAA student-athlete regulations to the rule of reason analysis,182 and (2) the
decision was not significant because the NCAA had already permitted its
members to provide cost-of-attendance allowances.183 Granted, O’Bannon had
a negligible impact on the operation of college football, and college athletics for
that matter. Yet, those who questioned the case’s importance failed to properly
appreciate the fact that O’Bannon was the first circuit decision to recognize a
relevant college education market and subject the NCAA’s amateurism
provisions to all three steps of the rule of reason analysis. And in doing so, the
Ninth Circuit deviated from the de facto exemption from antitrust for the
NCAA’s amateurism provisions that decades of district and circuit court
decisions developed based on near dogmatic reliance on Justice Stevens’s dicta
in Board of Regents. Thus, there is now a divide in the federal circuits on how
antitrust law applies to the NCAA’s regulation of student-athletes and whether
a relevant college education market exists.
The presence of a possible split among the federal circuits could provide
either the student-athletes or the NCAA with ammunition for a request of
certiorari to the Supreme Court following the resolution of the case in the Ninth
Circuit. Currently, the case is pending resolution of the student-athletes’ request
for en banc consideration before the Ninth Circuit. In addition to O’Bannon,
there are at least three other antitrust actions (Jenkins v. NCAA, Alston v. NCAA,
and Pugh v. NCAA) brought by student-athlete plaintiffs that are in early stages
of litigation. Jenkins is arguably the most threatening of the three because it was
brought within the Ninth Circuit by famed antitrust and labor law attorney
182. See, e.g., Jason Kurtyka, Post-O’Bannon, the Fight Between Student-Athletes and the NCAA
Rages On, JEFFREY S. MOORAD CTR. FOR STUDY SPORTS L., http://lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/sportslaw/?p=3339 (last visited June 9, 2016); Aaron Leibowitz, O’Bannon Ruling Allows
‘Amateurism’ Argument to Continue—for Now, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.si.com/cauldron/2015/10/01/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appeal-decision.
183. See, e.g., Jeremy Jarrett, The Great Escape: The NCAA Receives a Tremendous Ruling for Now
and the Future in the O’Bannon Appeal Decision, SPORTS ESQUIRES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://thesportsesquires.com/the-great-escape-the-ncaa-receives-a-tremendous-ruling-for-now-and-the-future-in-theobannon-appeal-decision/; Joe Nocera, O’Bannon’s Hollow Victory Over the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/opinion/joe-nocera-obannons-hollow-victory.html?_r=0; Marc Tracy & Ben Strauss, Court Strikes Down Payments to College Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/sports/obannon-ncaa-case-court-of-appeals-ruling.html;
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Jeffrey Kessler and aims to “strike down permanently the restrictions that prevent athletes in Division I basketball and the top tier of college football from
being fairly compensated for the billions of dollars in revenues that they help
generate.”184 If the Plaintiffs in Jenkins succeed, the NCAA would not be
permitted to impose any cap on student-athlete compensation.185 The uphill
battle for Kessler and his Plaintiffs is in convincing the court to go dramatically
further than what was done in O’Bannon by rejecting the position asserted by
Justice Stevens in dicta in Board of Regents that “amateurism” is needed to
create the product of college football and basketball.
And this brings us to the multi-billion dollar question, are NCAA
amateurism provisions necessary to the creation of the product of college
athletics? Certainly, aspects of the NCAA’s amateurism regulations (i.e.,
academic requirements) distinguish college from professional football.
Further, the possibility exists that some consumers consider academic aspects
of college football important. After all, the fact that NCAA athletic programs
represent universities and alumni, students, faculty, and staff from those schools
may place value in the fact that NCAA athletes are also students. Thus, the
academic nature of college football may be so intertwined with the product that
it drives some degree of sport consumption. Perhaps this academic nature is
what the Ninth Circuit actually referenced when it recognized a procompetitive
justification for the integration of student-athletes on college campuses. All the
same, this position is also nothing more than an assumption that is not supported
by any empirical economic evidence and “[l]egal presumptions that rest on
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally
disfavored in antitrust law.”186
The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon followed a line of cases that relied on legal
presumptions inherited from Justice Stevens’s dicta by accepting the NCAA’s
compensation cap as necessary to the creation of the product of college
football. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit linked student-athlete compensation to
the academic requirements found within the NCAA’s Bylaws. Yet,
student-athlete compensation limits can be severed from academic requirements
while still preserving the academic nature of college football. Take, for
example, graduate student assistantships. Graduate assistants are graduate
students who work for their university in some capacity (e.g., teaching classes
and assisting with research).187 Compensation provided through graduate
184. Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/ncaa/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaaamateur-model.
185. Id.
186. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1992).
187. Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective Bargaining Rights for
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assistantships varies depending on the academic program and the institution. It
is common for graduate students to select institutions, at least in part, based on
the compensation package provided through a graduate assistantship. However,
the graduate students who make those selections are still students and the
academic nature of their positions and their integration within the institution
remains intact. Therefore, even if we take the leap and accept the assumption
that the NCAA’s academic requirements (i.e., those that make athletes students)
are necessary to the creation of the product of college athletics, that necessity
does not justify a horizontal cap on student-athlete compensation.
Thus, the real issue in cases like O’Bannon and Jenkins is whether caps that
limit student-athlete compensation are necessary to the creation of the product
of college athletics. Framing the issue in this manner, however, should pose a
problem for the NCAA because a collection of sport management
professors who wrote as amici in support of the student-athletes in O’Bannon
could find nothing in their review of relevant sport motivation literature that
supported the assumption that consumers of college athletics do so because of
limits on student-athlete compensation.188 In fact, the only study the NCAA
could produce in support of its position was dismissed by the district court for
lacking credibility.189 The study was discredited because it included a
questionnaire with items that were flawed in a way that was found to have
influenced participant responses.190 Despite the lack of empirical support for
its position, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit accepted the NCAA’s
procompetitive justification as valid and both cited Justice Stevens’s dicta from
Board of Regents in doing so.
Accordingly, if there is one key takeaway from O’Bannon that future
classes of student-athlete plaintiffs must note, it is that, for some inexplicable
reason, they bear the burden of disproving an assumption that consumers care
about student-athlete compensation. As Kessler and his Plaintiffs in Jenkins
and the student-athlete plaintiffs in Alston prepare their materials for trial, they
would be smart to include any empirical economic evidence that supports the
position that consumers will still consume college athletics even if the
student-athletes receive more than what is provided via cost-of-attendance
allowances. Specifically, student-athlete plaintiffs must force the hand of the
court with exacting and irrefutable evidence that disproves the assumption
Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2001).
188. Brief for Sport Management Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at
7–8, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 803 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068),
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/01/30/14-16601%20amicus%20brief%20128%20by%20Sport%20Management%20Profs%20dkt%2057.pdf.
189. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
190. Id.
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derived from Justice Stevens’s dicta.
On the other end of the spectrum, any study presented by the NCAA in
defense of its compensation limits should be required by courts to actually
evidence that consumption would be affected if student-athletes are
compensated beyond the cost-of-attendance. Consumer attitudes about
student-athlete pay are meaningless in the market if they do not influence
consumption habits. But most importantly, consumer preference should never
justify horizontal restraints on labor costs. That is what the cost-of-attendance
cap is—a cost-saving measure disguised as consumer welfare protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
In classic Greek mythology, Pandora’s curiosity led her to open a box that
forever shaped life.191 Pandora was warned by Zeus not to open the box, but
she did and from it escaped all evils known to man. The first of all women tried
quickly to close the box and limit what was let into the world, but it was too
late. In 1984, the Supreme Court fully opened an already leaking box with its
decision in Board of Regents and in doing so let all sorts of problems into
college football. Similar to how Pandora attempted to limit what escaped from
the infamous box, the majority in Board of Regents also tried to control the
degree of what it unleashed on college football by shielding from antitrust law
the NCAA’s amateurism provisions, and just like Pandora, the Court’s efforts
were unsuccessful.
It is time for a new antitrust approach for big-time college athletics,
particularly football. In the shadow of Board of Regents, college football has
ballooned into a multibillion dollar industry. The NCAA’s amici of antitrust
legal scholars argued in their brief, “Antitrust cases are . . . poor vehicles for
courts and agencies to socially reengineer products and services to their
liking.”192 Yet, that is exactly what the courts have done by shielding the
NCAA’s limits on student-athlete compensation from antitrust law. Courts have
preserved the “revered tradition of amateurism”193 by preventing inflation of
athlete compensation; inflation that is expected in a free market. Thus, the time
has come to lift the veil of amateurism from the face of college football and
basketball and subject them to the same antitrust analyses that apply to their
professional counterparts. Cases like O’Bannon, Jenkins, and Alston provide
courts with the opportunity to effect that change.
191. For a detailed account of the Pandora myth, see generally MARK P.O. MORFORD & ROBERT J.
LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (6th ed. 1999).
192. Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant,
supra note 169, at 3.
193. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
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No matter what the Ninth Circuit decides in regards to the
student-athletes’ en banc request, the court’s final resolution of the case likely
will not end the debate.194 The can will be kicked down the road until it
eventually reaches the steps of the Supreme Court building. Whether the case
that gets there is O’Bannon or some other, the applicability of antitrust to NCAA
student-athlete seems destined for Supreme Court determination. This means a
reconsideration of the reasoning in Justice Stevens’s Board of Regents dicta. To
that extent, O’Bannon, or whatever case makes it to the high court, is to Board
of Regents what Flood was to Federal Baseball Club. Will that Court make the
same mistake that Justice Stevens said was made in Flood by preserving an
antitrust analysis that no longer made sense? Based on his comments to the
Sports Lawyers Association, the possibility exists that Justice Stevens would do
things differently if he could hear the case that challenges his reasoning in Board
of Regents. But just as Justice Holmes was not around for Flood, Justice Stevens will have no say in O’Bannon. The great antitrust jurist now finds himself
in the same spot as the rest of us, in the cheap seats watching to see how things
play out.

194. At the time this Article was first written, the en banc motion before the Ninth Circuit had yet
to be heard and decided. The Ninth Circuit has since rejected that request.

